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LAW AND RHETORIC 
Richard H. Weisberg* 
HERACLES' Bow: EsSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW. By James Boyd White. Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press. 1985. Pp. xviii, 251. $22.50. 
For the past fourteen years, since the publication of The Legal Im-
agination, 1 James Boyd White has been the foremost rhetorician of 
law in our academic culture. With a consistency approaching self-
confessed repetitiveness, 2 White has sought to save law from science, 
bureaucracy, and, particularly in his latest book, from the social sci-
ences. Law is, for him, neither exclusively a knowable series of rules 
available for application to any given case, nor a governmental power 
base, nor a mechanism designed to fulfill particular ends, such as eco-
nomic efficiency or even the betterment of the general welfare. Law is, 
largely, rhetoric, "the art of establishing the probable by arguing from 
our sense of the probable" (p. 31). For White, law consists of the 
eternally shifting relationships of speaker to audience; he believes less 
in the power of the individualized speech act (say, of the poem or judi-
cial opinion) than of the relationship, the dialogue itself. Ours is "a 
culture of argument, perpetually remade by its participants" (p. 35). 
In Heracles' Bow, White attempts to redeem rhetoric not only for 
its central place in law but also in its own right. Admitting that rheto-
ric suffers both from purely contemporary and considerably more 
long-standing disaffection (Plato attacked it as "a false art" (p. 31)), 
White nonetheless affirms his admiration for rhetoricians: 
This means that the rhetorician - that is, each of us when we speak to 
persuade or to establish community in other ways - must accept the 
double fact that there are real and important differences between cul-
tures and that one is in substantial part the product of one's own culture. 
The rhetorician, like the lawyer, is thus engaged in a process of meaning-
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. M.A. 1967, 
Ph.D. 1970, Cornell University; J.D. 1974, Columbia University. - Ed. 
I. J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGlNATlON (1973) [hereinafter THE LEGAL IMAGINATION]. 
See also J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984). 
2. White calls this book "the third in a series" (p. xiv), and later points out that "[o]ther 
versions of some of the ideas at work here ... can be found" in the two earlier books (p. xviii). 
Far from criticizing this repetitive aspect, I applaud it in the practice of this review, for it is the 
constancy in White that I most fully address - his views on law as rhetoric and literature. 
Indeed, I do not treat at length here the more idiosyncratic chapters in this book, see, e.g., Chap· 
ter Four, "The Invisible Discourse of the Law: Reflections on Legal Literacy and General Edu· 
cation," and Chapter Nine, "Making Sense of What We Do: The Criminal Law as a System of 
Meaning." 
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making and community-building of which he or she is in part the sub-
ject. To do this requires him or her to face and to accept the condition of 
radical uncertainty in which we live: uncertainty as to the meaning of 
words, uncertainty as to their effect on others, uncertainty even as to our 
own motivations. [pp. 39-40] 
For White, the rhetorician positively reflects, rather than nega-
tively emphasizes, the "radical uncertainties" (p. 40) of human exist-
ence. The predominant metaphors in Heracles' Bow evoke the fluidity 
both of life and language; to survive the unpredictable swells of our 
relativistic culture, what better protection than the equally slippery, 
swampy medium of words? It is as though we are to picture a system 
concerned less with mastering or resisting our elemental doubts than 
with replicating and furthering them through rhetoric. 
Where can one place such a world view in the context of late-twen-
tieth-century thought? How can a belief in words, and in their power 
both to validate an institution (law) and to ennoble the individual, 
make sense to us at the end of a century in which, to many minds 
anyway, words have been hideously debased, employed more to distort 
and destroy than to co-exist with or improve their listeners? White, 
who himself suggested the antinomy between rhetoric and ethics in the 
section on American slavery laws in The Legal Imagination, 3 still 
struggles to answer this question in Heracles' Bow. Like Jurgen 
Habermas for philosophy,4 like some left-wing reformist thinkers for 
religion, 5 White here tries to provide for lawyers a validation of the 
pursuit of intersubjective language in a world correctly skeptical of 
words and doubtful that their institutional purveyors truly seek dia-
logue more than domination. 6 
3. See THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 1, at 432-82. 
4. See J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RA-
TIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1984), and J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975). The no-
tion of dialogue in the latter text is critiqued in JEAN-FRAN\;OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN 
CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 65-66 (1984). 
5. See, e.g., H. KONG, J. VEN Ess, H. VON STIETENCRON & H. BECHERT, CHRISTIANITY 
AND THE WORLD RELIGIONS: PATHS OF DIALOGUE WITH !SLAM, HINDUISM, AND BUDDHISM 
(1986). 
6. The foremost modem anti-rhetorician or, as I might better call him, "dialogue-skeptic," is 
of course Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche, himself a brilliant stylist, always warned against writ-
ers and institutions primarily centered around the word; he consistently exhorted his readers to 
distrust the word, to get behind it, and to detect the essentially nonverbal will to power that had 
generated the words themselves. This explains, for example, his lifelong attack on Flaubert, in 
whose work, Nietzsche felt, 
life no longer resides in the whole. The Word gets the upper hand and jumps out of the 
sentence, the sentence stretches too far and obscures the meaning of the page, the page 
acquires life at the expense of the whole - the whole is no longer a whole. But that is the 
simile for every style of decadence. 
NIETZSCHE WERKE, pt. 6, vol. 3, at 21 (1968) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.) (Wagner's 
Case, Aphorism 7) (my translation). He believed that rhetoric furthered the negative aims of the 
resentful institutions that had come to dominate modem Europe. See, e.g., THE GENEALOGY OF 
MORALS 259 (F. Golffing trans. 1956) (Essay III, Aphorism 14) (on the perversion of justice by 
modem German law). For the twentieth-century observer, Nietzsche's skepticism is all the more 
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White thus makes a controversial claim that, as he defends it, be-
comes increasingly instead of decreasingly problematic. His assertion 
that law is rhetoric seems more intuitively accurate than, say, the view 
that law is science or economics. But his defense of legal rhetoric fi-
nally lacks the two elements provided by both traditional jurispru-
dence and the social sciences: a normative scale on which to judge 
legal behavior and a forthright analysis of such behavior as it is in fact 
practiced. 
The absence of prescriptive knowledge in White's writings seems at 
first harmonious with most Law and Literature theory. Since Car-
dozo's famous essay, "Law and Literature,"7 American proponents of 
that interrelation have taken it as axiomatic that law can never be re-
duced to norms; along with the neo-realists, but with more of an inter-
est in narrative, Law and Literature theorists expounded the complete 
individuality of all legal players. Much less bound to rules or theory 
than was elsewhere suggested, the legal actor was perceived as consist-
ently in the business of expressing his or her own interests or values 
through narrative. Sometimes the narrative act inspired and trans-
formed the actor (Cardozo's belief8); at other times it merely couched 
self-interest in acceptable or even overwhelming narrative structures 
(my own, more pessimistic view9); but in no difficult case was the actor 
assumed in fact to be significantly more constrained than by the power 
of his or her own rhetorical talent. 10 
Often White assumes the posture of the narrative realist, albeit in 
the guise of several long footnotes directed at various modem legal 
theoreticians. I I But predominantly he breaks from this Law and 
Literature tradition, promising his reader norms rather than realities: 
I should perhaps also make explicit, although it should be obvious 
enough, that my account of law is not meant to be a description of the 
way it is actually practiced by most judges and lawyers but a representa-
tion of the possibilities I see in this form of life both for its practitioners 
and for the community at large. My apology for the possibilities of the 
life of the law should thus not be misread as a defense of existing ar-
rangements; rather, it should be taken as an elaboration of the hopes I 
valid: after Hitler, or even (much more benignly) during the era of mass media communication, 
we cannot look naively at the notion of "dialogue" or the institutional purveyors of rhetoric. 
7. B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CAR-
DOZO 339 (M. Hall ed. 1947) (originally published in 14 YALE REV. 699 (1925)) [hereinafter 
Law and Literature]. 
8. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 89 (1924). 
9. R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN Moo-
ERN FICTION (1984) (chap. 9). 
10. Thus Cardozo: "The [judicial] opinion will need persuasive force, or the impressive vir-
tue of sincerity and fire, or the mnemonic power of alliteration and antithesis, or the terseness 
and tang of the proverb, and the maxim. Neglect the help of these allies, and it may never win its 
way." Law and Literature, supra note 7, at 342. 
11. See, e.g., p. x n. l and p. xi n.2. 
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think we can and should have for the law and for ourselves as lawyers, 
which may in fact serve as a ground upon which a criticism of law at 
once idealistic and realistic can rest. [p. xv] 
Yet White never manages to convey systematically what these 
"hopes" are. Perhaps they are too simple to need systematic elabora-
tion. As another reviewer of Heracles' Bow has recently suggested, 
there may be little more to White prescriptively than the wish that we 
shall all continue to talk to one another, and the hope that in so speak-
ing we shall change minds while keeping our own minds open to 
counterargument.12 These are fine sentiments, but I am not sure that, 
even in today's still anti-literary legal climate, 13 we need three books 
and a dozen essays to make the point. 
Instead, White's strengths appear to be descriptive. He quite accu-
rately, and I think extremely clearly, 14 describes the way law has al-
ways been practiced. Far from identifying the "ideal possibilities of 
the forms of speech and life we call the law" (p. 242), White elaborates 
an apologia for the way it actually is done. But his descriptive analysis 
stumbles, not only because he denies its presence, but also because he 
often seems not to notice (or at least not to articulate overtly) the im-
plications of his data. 
Although one should, one need not go beyond the first chapter of 
Heracles' Bow to seize the paradox of White's rhetorical mode. This 
chapter, "Persuasion And Community In Sophocles' Philoctetes" (pp. 
3-27), furthers the reputation of its author as a knowledgeable and 
insightful critic of classical texts. 15 Sophocles' Philoctetes, which also 
provides the book's title, tells the story of Heracles' bow, Philoctetes' 
magical weapon, sought by Odysseus on behalf of the Greek warriors. 
12. See Carter, Book Review, 20 GA. L. REv. 793, 798-803 (1986). 
13. While the characteristic affection of law for literature (see, e.g., R. FERGUSON, LAW AND 
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984)) in this country is again on the upswing, serious schol-
ars such as Frederick Schauer continue to display a dismally undereducated antipathy towards 
literary expression. See, e.g., Schauer, Liars, Novelists, and The Law of Defamation, 51 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 233, 253 (1985) (novelists are accurately called "liars"); id. at 257 ("it should not be 
at all surprising that any society would consider truth, in its unadulterated form, as having some 
primacy over fiction"). Judge Bork also has seemed insensitive to literary art's "higher truths" 
and pervasive impact on the polity. See Bork, Neutral Principles, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1971). Since 
Professor Schauer is acknowledged by Professor White for his help in commenting on portions of 
Heracles' Bow (p. xvii), I may be underestimating his potential awareness of the value to our 
culture of literary expression. Other signs, such as Richard Posner's recent entrance into the 
Law and Literature debates, see, e.g., Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 1351 (1986) [hereinafter A Relation Reargued]; LaRue, Posner on Literature, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 325 (1986) (response to Posner); Posner, Book Review, 96 YALE L.J. 1173 (1986) (re-
viewing R. WEISBERG, supra note 9) portend a verification of J. Allen Smith's interdisciplinary 
vision in Smith, The Coming Renaissance in Law and Literature, 7 U. Mo. L.F. 84 (1977). 
14. I disagree with Posner's characterization of White's recent writings as "pitched at so high 
a level of abstraction that" one might lose "the thread of his discourse." A Relation Reargued, 
supra note 13, at 1392 (referring to an essay that became Chapter Two of Heracles' Bow). I find 
White's writing clear and invariably coherent. 
15. See, e.g., A Relation Reargued, supra note 13, at 1359. 
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They need the bow to defeat the Trojans, but to get it they must con-
vince the exiled Philoctetes to hand it over. Since Odysseus partially 
brought about that exile, he realizes that he would stand little chance 
of success, so he convinces Achilles' son Neoptolemus to confront 
Philoctetes. Reluctant at first to do so, since the task involves either 
lying or force, Neoptolemus fairly quickly16 accedes to Odysseus' ar-
guments that the bow is a necessity both for his own honor and for the 
greater glory of the Greeks. 
Neoptolemus thus approaches the exiled Philoctetes, woos him 
falsely, undergoes the reversal of empathizing with him, and finally 
succeeds only in having him agree to return to Greece with the bow. 
That remedy will not do, however; the majestic Heracles himself has 
to appear to remind both Philoctetes and Neoptolemus that their he-
roic destiny requires bringing the bow immediately into battle against 
the Trojans. Like the ghost in Act III of Hamlet, Heracles encourages 
others to action more by the rhetoric of his presence than by words: 
he requires a scant forty lines to convince Philoctetes and Neoptole-
mus to join the battle. This powerful, essentially nonverbal rhetoric of 
presence White chooses not to recognize (or at least not to analyze), 
but it is unanswerable. The play ends with Philoctetes stirred to the 
very action that Odysseus desired at its beginning. 
I do not argue with White's original position regarding this play, 
namely, that it well describes the kinds of rhetoric available to law-
yers. As Odysseus persuades Neoptolemus, and then the latter alter-
nately conquers and is conquered by Philoctetes, the viewer does see 
several models of lawyer-like rhetoric. Furthermore, White forth-
rightly states that Odysseus' (and for that matter Heracles') goal-ori-
ented forms of persuasion succeed pithily, whereas Neoptolemus' (and 
in a sense Philoctetes') more empathetic and variable rhetoric fails to 
convince or finally to affect the outcome of events. But White pro-
fesses a lack of concern with mere "ends." Here, and throughout the 
book, he claims to be interested in the means used by a speaker, means 
that must comprehend both the humanity of others and the "condi-
tions of uncertainty that render [ends-means] 'rationality' worse than 
useless" (p. 23). 
By this test, according to White, Odysseus utterly fails. White says 
this of him: 
Odysseus is not a model of the crafty lawyer after all, unscrupulous but 
effective, rational but base, but an example of a lawyer who is bad in 
both senses of the term. At just the level where his claims for himself are 
most seriously made, that he is a pragmatic success, he is in fact a total 
failure. 
16. It takes Odysseus a mere seventy lines to convince Neoptolemus to assist in the task of 
seizing Heracles' bow from Philoctetes. See SOPHOCLES, Philoctetes, in SOPHOCLES II 190, 197-
200 (Grene & Lattimore eds. 1957) (lines 50-120). 
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What Odysseus misses is the reality of the social world, and its 
power. His cast of mind, which itemizes the world into a chain of desid-
erata and mechanisms, is incapable of understanding the reality and 
force of shared understandings and confidences . . . or, in terms of this 
play, [of deriving] confidence and pleasure in those activities by which 
Neoptolemus and Philoctetes create a world of action and significance. 
[p. 20] 
White sees Odysseus as the poorest sort oflawyer (at one point he calls 
him a corporatist, "more fascist than Benthamite" (p. 9 n.1)), a man 
"whose whole being is spent in the service of ends he cannot examine" 
(p. 21). On the other hand, "Neoptolemus' position, by contrast, is 
based upon his own character or identity .... His initial response to 
Odysseus' suggestion is a kind of instinctive reaction, learned but not 
wholly understood: for him force and persuasion are both acceptable, 
but deceit is not" (p. 9). 
The claim that Odysseus loses himself and sacrifices others 
through a deceitful and all-consuming quest for ends, and that Neop-
tolemus preserves his sense of self by treating others honestly and as 
complete "persons," cannot withstand scrutiny, however. First, the 
play itself is much kinder to Odysseus; as the chorus proclaims, 
"Odysseus was one man, appointed by many, by their command he 
has done this, a service to his friends." 17 Odysseus seeks no personal 
gain, and he may (for all we are told) have fully examined the merits 
of his task. After all, Heracles himself finally proclaims the rightness 
of Odysseus' goals, and the audience simply cannot doubt their 
justness. 
What is more, Odysseus' means are always communicated overtly. 
He never hides from Neoptolemus the sordid side of dealing with Phil-
octetes and frankly advises him to forgo his own sense of virtue tempo-
rarily for the greater welfare of the Greek community. (To condemn 
this would be to condemn, in Measure for Measure, the doomed Clau-
dio's plea to his virtuous sister, Isabella: "Sweet sister, let me live:/ 
What sin you do to save a brother's life,/ Nature dispenses with the 
deed so far/ That it becomes a virtue."18 These situations cannot be 
treated as unambiguous or morally clear.) 
As for Neoptolemus, his failure to resist Odysseus' argument 
speaks more to his own weakness than to any fault in Odysseus. Far 
from embodying honesty, he goes on to employ pure deceit on the 
pathetic Philoctetes, lying to him over a dramatic space more than ten 
times greater than Odysseus' frank seventy-line dialogue with Neop-
tolemus himself. When the dismayed title hero finally learns of Neop-
tolemus' deceit, the play's most terrifying moment of cruelty and 
17. SOPHOCLES, supra note 16, at 239-40 (lines 1142-43). 
18. W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, act III, scene i, lines 134-37, in 1 THE ANNO-
TATED SHAKESPEARE, 720 (Rowse ed. 1978). 
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catharsis arises. The viewer cannot deny the emotional effect of N eo-
potolemus' deliberate and long-lasting mistreatment of Philoctetes. 
Yet, as to Neoptolemus' tactics, White has this to say: 
[D]espite his conscious intentions, Neoptolemus is at the most basic level 
in fact not dishonest: both his own story and his responses to Philocte-
tes' story are in a deep sense true. The false surface version of his story, 
that Odysseus has deprived him of the arms of his father, has its deeper 
true version (to which we have just been witness) in the scene in which 
Odysseus does deprive Neoptolemus of himself - "give me yourself for 
just a shameless part of a single day." In thus disintegrating him, Odys-
seus has deprived Neoptolemus of his capacity as a man, of his nature 
and inheritance as a coherent and virtuous self speaking a coherent lan-
guage - of his "arms" indeed. What Neoptolemus pretends is in fact 
true: he and Philoctetes are bound together by similar injuries at the 
same hands. [p. 13] 
Here, White the rhetorician gets the better of White the critic. Ap-
parently he wants his reader to reject Odysseus' mere quest for ends 
(however meritorious) and at the same time to endorse Neoptolemus' 
means (which are dishonest) while preserving the right to interpret 
falsehood as truth, down as up, wrong as right. Odysseus' grimy di-
rectness is thereby devalued as somehow inhumane and Neoptolemus' 
long-winded lies revalued as "in fact not dishonest" (p. 13). If White 
means this to be normative - and we are here dealing with his most 
important chapter - the lesson is hardly edifying. Apparently the 
rhetorically sound lawyer should be neither effective as to goals nor 
totally honest as to means. Neoptolemus' cruel lies to Philoctetes, if 
rationalized as truths, proffer a norm that seems to condone hypocrisy. 
Perhaps we should lie, expecting our falsehoods to be interpreted later 
as truths. Or perhaps White hopes that we ourselves, like Neoptole-
mus, will renounce our deceit. Yet only the sight of Philoctetes' physi-
cal agony from the wounds he has been suffering in exile moves 
Neoptolemus (after 700 lines!) to sympathetic honesty. How many 
lawyers, caught in the web of lies, will be saved by this kind of Sopho-
clean reversal? Neoptolemus' wordy equivocation, taken as a norm, 
might produce more deception and cruelty than Odysseus' forthright 
commitment to a respectable goal. t9 
19. In the play itself, the bad rhetorician is identified (by Philoctetes) as Thersites, not Odys· 
seus. I have had occasion in the past to challenge White's view of legal rhetoric with the example 
of Thersites, the ignoble, argumentative Greek. See Weisberg, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. 
REV. 327, 331 (1974) (reviewing J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION). The relationship of 
rhetoric to community (means-end?) seems positive in the pithy leader Odysseus, hateful in the 
wordy coward Thersites. 
I think White fails to see a vital aspect of the Odysseus-Thersites dichotomy. For the Greeks, 
"community" was an essentially nonverbal phenomenon. It fell outside of rhetoric. It was 
claimed and established by the intuition of the group, who shared values inspired by education 
and affection. In disputes, the sight of which great leaders stood for which position often was as 
determinative as were elegant arguments. In Philoctetes, there is simply no doubt that Odysseus' 
"ends" are just. No rhetoric can change this fact. So Odysseus, brutally honest (unlike a Thersi· 
tes-type), does not deign to distort his position through needless verbiage. 
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Yet without so intending it, I believe, White here accurately por-
trays the lawyer's rhetorical enterprise. Once a client imposes a task 
on a lawyer, the latter must often replicate Neoptolemus' prevarica-
tion. Quite a few matters in every career contain distasteful elements; 
no lawyer has the lifelong opportunity to pick and choose his tasks. 
(Some clients, like Odysseus in my reading at least, have reflected on 
the merits of their position before retaining counsel.) The role of law-
yer then usually compels the already doubtful practitioner to create 
rhetoric in the service of those goals. In almost every case, the lawyer 
falsifies, or at least grossly exaggerates, some aspect of the existing 
facts or law. (White euphemizes this by saying, throughout Heracles' 
Bow, that the lawyer acts upon a received body of wisdom and rheto-
ric, and in so acting changes it.) Rarely if ever does the object of this 
falsification (the Philoctetes-figure), whether opposing party and coun-
sel, judge, or jury, inspire in a workaday lawyer sufficient sympathy to 
reverse his (or her) tactics. Instead, exaggerations expand until 
checked by an adversarial act of power, symbolized in the play by Her-
acles' appearance. 
Yet, perhaps by analogy to an almost Dostoevskian irrationality 
that lies within each of us, legal rhetoric usually produces some resolu-
tion acceptable to the client and also to the other parties. And so, 
until and unless political events (as they often have) raise the moral 
stakes immeasurably,20 the systematic use of questionable rhetoric 
seems attuned to our culture's desires. 
If Neoptolemus stands as the model of a good lawyer, it can only 
be within a system as just described. But in fact Sophocles leaves open 
the question of whether Odysseus and Heracles, in their frank espousal 
of a single, reflected goal, may not offer us a less deceptive, more effi-
cient, 21 and, I would be tempted to say, more Judaeo-classical model 
20. I am in the process of studying legal behavior during one of those periods when discur-
sive lying of the sort unchallenged here by White contributed to a rotten structure of annihilation 
and terror. See Weisberg, Avoiding Central Realities: Narrative Terror and the Failure of French 
Culture Under the Occupation, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 151 (1983). White himself sensitively treats an 
equivalent American period of hideous legal rhetoric in The Legal Imagination, see note 3 supra. 
Surprisingly, there has been little development of the implications for his rhetoric of such histori-
cal periods. 
21. White denigrates efficiency throughout this book. See, e.g., pp. 30-32, 214. I think his 
theory of language, more perhaps than his pro-"means" epistemology, explains White's sharp 
antipathy to law and economics. His rhetoric has always privileged "inconsistency and tension, 
the openness to ambiguity and uncertainty" (p. 124) - the single writer's "many-voicedness" (p. 
124) or "writing two ways." Not all legal rhetorics, of course, need strive for such complexity 
and absence of directness. I think that White can mislead legal writers by suggesting that the 
single, clear, harmonious (indeed, "efficient") voice is somehow foreign to law. Indeed, he explic-
itly suggests this in a curious chapter of this book, "The Invisible Discourse Of The Law: Reflec-
tions On Legal Literacy and General Education," in which he makes the claim that the recent 
"Plain English" movement in law will be fruitless, because legal thinking will automatically 
render any system of words (even "plain" ones) strange and unfamiliar. Seep. 72. While it may 
seem that White is being an elitist here, I think not; he means that lawyers among themselves will 
never be able to simplify their manner of writing. I take a considerably different approach to 
legal writing in R. WEISBERG, WHEN LAWYERS WRITE (1987). 
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for law.22 Admittedly, such a model requires us to do what White 
attempts only occasionally in his book: to analyze the ends themselves 
before proceeding, to make certain that our own fundamental values 
are sound (not, as in White's terraqueous world, always in flux) and 
then to proceed forthrightly in the service of those values. To put it in 
White's own terms, Odysseus becomes a "fascist" only if the ends he is 
serving are rotten and vicious (as they here are not); Neoptolemus 
risks becoming a fascist every time he willingly places his mouth at the 
service of anyone who has the rhetorical force (or the capital) to in-
duce him to speak up at length and without conviction.23 
In the final chapter of Heracles' Bow, White continues his apology 
for legal rhetoric by creating a dialogue in the manner of Plato's Gor-
gias. His aim is to respond to that dialogue's attack on rhetoric by 
having two modem lawyers converse with Socrates on the merits of 
their position. The first of these, Euerges, seems wholeheartedly 
pleased with acquisition and power (all his urges are fulfilled by the 
system as it is). But the second, like White himself, tries to rationalize 
the law as a noble rhetorical enterprise. His name, aptly chosen, is 
Euphemes. This idealist perceives the lawyer as consistently enriching 
the lives of all around him (or her), beginning with the client: "I will 
not treat you shabbily; do not expect me to treat others so. I will not 
be your mouthpiece, but your lawyer" (p. 234). 
Distinguishing the case of a lawyer in an utterly corrupt system 
(but nonetheless suggesting that, as in modem-day South Africa, it 
might be better to persevere within the system (p. 230)), Euphemes 
rationalizes the lies and distortions endemic to the lawyer's rhetorical 
workplace. To White's credit, he has Socrates challenge Euphemes in 
some of the most difficult areas of rhetorical behavior: cross-examina-
tion of the truthful witness, arguments to convince a judge, etc. As to 
the latter, Euphemes observes: 
What this view of the law means about the ethics of legal argument is 
this. First, while I am in a sense "insincere" when I say to a judge, for 
example, that "justice requires" or the "law requires" such and such 
result, this insincerity is a highly artificial one, for no one is deceived by 
it. No one in the courtroom would be surprised to learn that this is a 
form of argument and not a statement of personal belief. But at the same 
time I am implicitly saying something else, with respect to which I am 
by any standard being sincere: that the argument I make is the best one 
that my capacities and resources permit me to make on this side of the 
case. This is a statement made by performance rather than in explicit 
22. White correctly identifies the modern manifestations of the Neoptolemus-Philoctetes rhe-
torical mode as "a restatement of the basic Christian ethic." P. 5. But this is a Greek text from 
the fifth century B.c.! 
23. It is always easiest to blame the one who plants an idea rather than the one (or the 
millions) who somehow find it within their moral make-up to bring the idea to fruition. In this 
case, as the chorus suggests, the originating idea is not even a corrupt one. See note 17 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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conceptual terms, and it is a statement not about the nature of "justice," 
but about the nature of the resources our legal culture affords for defend-
ing or attacking a particular result. But it is a statement honestly made. 
In making this statement the lawyer's audience is the judge, and we 
serve her directly not by telling her what we actually think she ought to 
do, but by showing her something about the nature of her own situation 
in our culture. Together, the arguments of the two lawyers define the 
boundaries within which the judge operates by showing what even these 
parties, opposed as they are, must agree to, and they tell her what topics 
the culture requires her to face and deal with. Our arguments also pro-
vide her with a testing ground for her own thoughts. [pp. 225-26] 
Given this description, there are few situations, however morally 
intolerable, that a lawyer could not rationalize and even promote 
through rhetoric. The last sentence particularly brings us back to Ne-
optolemus and his relationship with Philoctetes. For, as the former 
deceives and injures the latter, he also cedes to Philoctetes his moral 
integrity as surely as he had surrendered it to Odysseus. Philoctetes 
plays the White-ian judge to Neoptolemus' legalistic distortions. "Lis-
ten to my lies but perceive them as honest. Show me by your own 
potential forthrightness the path I should follow!" If this is the pro-
gram White desires (through Euphemes, and perhaps with some sense 
of irony) for law, he has created an apologetically descriptive, not a 
normative, manual for what goes on anyway. I do not think that 
White intended such complacency. 
If I have stressed the first and last chapters of Heracles' Bow, it is 
because they (like Chapter Two, from which I have already cited24) 
represent the rhetorical body of the book. But there is also the book's 
soul. It is the soul of White the literary critic. When he moves in on 
the single text - legal, literary, or other - White is often superb. 
Thus Chapters Seven and Eight strike me as the strongest in the book, 
covering quite astutely Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire (which White includes to demonstrate both that his-
tory is also poetic and that writing often transforms the project of the 
writer), Aeschylus' Oresteia, and Katherine Anne Porter's "Noon 
Wine." These chapters, together with Chapter Five ("Reading Law 
and Reading Literature: Law as Language") convincingly further 
White's view that "the life of the lawyer is at its heart a literary one" 
(p. 77). 
It is in the waters between rhetoric and poetics that White seems to 
founder. And if he has not succeeded in the formidable task of justify-
ing rhetoric, either generally or as he would like it to be practiced, he 
surely extends admirably his once equally ambitious project (now, 
thanks in part to him, fully acceptable) of emphasizing the imagina-
tive, narrative, and fictive elements that pervade the lawyer's life. 
24. See text following note 2 supra. 
